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Abstract. Katla volcano, located beneath the Mýrdalsjökull
ice cap in southern Iceland, is capable of producing catas-
trophic jökulhlaup. The Icelandic Civil Protection (ICP), in
conjunction with scientists, local police and emergency man-
agers, developed mitigation strategies for possible jökulh-
laupproducedduringfutureKatlaeruptions. Thesestrategies
were tested during a full-scale evacuation exercise in March
2006. A positive public response during a volcanic crisis not
only depends upon the public’s knowledge of the evacuation
plan but also their knowledge and perception of the possi-
ble hazards. To improve the effectiveness of residents’ com-
pliance with warning and evacuation messages it is impor-
tant that emergency management ofﬁcials understand how
the public interpret their situation in relation to volcanic haz-
ards and their potential response during a crisis and apply
this information to the ongoing development of risk mitiga-
tion strategies. We adopted a mixed methods approach in
order to gain a broad understanding of residents’ knowledge
and perception of the Katla volcano in general, jökulhlaup
hazards speciﬁcally and the regional emergency evacuation
plan. This entailed ﬁeld observations during the major evac-
uation exercise, interviews with key emergency management
ofﬁcials and questionnaire survey interviews with local resi-
dents. Our survey shows that despite living within the hazard
zone, many residents do not perceive that their homes could
be affected by a jökulhlaup, and many participants who per-
ceive that their homes are safe, stated that they would not
evacuate if an evacuation warning was issued. Alarmingly,
most participants did not receive an evacuation message dur-
ing the exercise. However, the majority of participants who
took part in the exercise were positive about its implementa-
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tion. This assessment of resident knowledge and perception
of volcanic hazards and the evacuation plan is the ﬁrst of its
kind in this region. Our data can be used as a baseline by the
ICP for more detailed studies in Iceland’s volcanic regions.
1 Introduction
The Icelandic term “jökulhlaup” is deﬁned as a sudden burst
of meltwater from a glacier and may occur for a period of
several minutes to several weeks (Björnsson, 2002). All con-
ﬁrmed historic eruptions of Katla, the volcano underlying the
Mýrdalsjökull ice cap in southern Iceland (Fig. 1), have pro-
duced jökulhlaup (Thordarson and Larsen, 2007). A Katla
eruption can melt through the ∼400m of ice covering the
Katla caldera in 1–2h, producing a catastrophic jökulhlaup
with a peak discharge of 100000–300000m3 s−1 (Björns-
son, 2002).
Transporting volcanic debris and large ice blocks, jökulh-
laup have been the most serious hazard during historic Katla
eruptions but not the only hazard. Local communities 30km
from the eruption site have been subjected to heavy tephra
fallout and lightning strikes (Larsen, 2000) while jökulh-
lauphavetriggeredsmalltsunamiduringpastvolcanicevents
(Guðmundsson et al., 2008). Earthquakes, felt by local com-
munities, signify the start of an eruption. They are not how-
ever, of sufﬁcient magnitude to cause major damage (Guð-
mundsson et al., 2008). Furthermore, not all Katla eruptions
have been subglacial. Lava covered ∼780km2 of land during
the 934–938AD Eldgjá ﬂood lava eruption which occurred
along a 75km discontinuous and predominately subaerial
volcanic ﬁssure extending from the Katla caldera (Thordar-
son and Larsen, 2007).
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Fig. 1. The jökulhlaup hazard zone of Rangávallasýsla. The hazard zone is determined to be the maximum ﬂood area for a catastrophic
jökulhlaup. Communities located within the hazard zone are Vestur-Eyjafjöll, Fljótshlíð, Austur and Vestur-Landeyjar and Þykkvibær.
Evacuation centres are located in Hella, Hvolsvöllur and Skógar. The three catchment areas of Mýrdalsjökull: Entujökull, Sólheimajökull
and Kötlujökull are represented by E, S and K respectively.
Since settlement in the 9th century Katla has erupted ap-
proximately 1–3times per century (Thordarson and Larsen,
2007). At least 21 eruptions have occurred during this time
with the last conﬁrmed eruption in 1918AD (Larsen, 2000).
All historic jökulhlaup have emanated from the catchment
areas of Kötlujökull and Sólheimajökull while none have
come from the Entujökull catchment. Unconﬁrmed vol-
canic activity may have created the jökulhlaup which oc-
curred in 1955AD and 1999AD from the Kötlujökull and
Sólheimajökull catchments, respectively (Björnsson et al.,
2000; Russell et al., 2000; Guðmundsson, 2005).
The Markarﬂjót valley was subjected to volcanic jökulh-
laup emanating from the Entujökull catchment prior to settle-
ment. A series of large, valley-ﬁlling prehistoric jökulhlaup
wereidentiﬁedbySmith(2004)andLarsenetal.(2005)from
sedimentary deposits within the Markarﬂjót valley. Further,
Smith and Haraldsson (2005) determined that the last vol-
canic jökulhlaup on the Markarﬂjót occurred 1200 yrs be-
fore present. Other types of jökulhlaup have ﬂooded the
Markarﬂjót in more recent times. In 1967AD, a rock/ice
avalanche caused an outburst ﬂood from the proglacial lake
of Steinsholtsjökull on the northern ﬂank of Eyjafjallajökull.
This ﬂood transported boulders measuring up to 80m3 5km
from the rockslide scar (Kjartansson, 1967). Lastly, geother-
mal meltwater drains from subglacial lakes in small, more
frequent jökulhlaup from all three catchment areas (Björns-
son et al., 2000).
Flood simulation models based on data from prehistoric
jökulhlaupwereusedtoidentifypeakdischargeandtemporal
and spatial distribution of a possible catastrophic jökulhlaup
ﬂoodingfromtheEntujökullcatchmentdowntheMarkarﬂjót
(Hólm and Kjaran, 2005). This populated farming region
forms part of the Rangávallasýsla municipality. The models
show that a catastrophic jökulhlaup with a peak discharge of
300000m3 s−1 would reach its maximum within 2h, ﬂood-
ing to a depth of up to 15m, at the uppermost farms in Fljót-
shlíð and up to 10m in Vestur-Eyjafjöll. However, many of
the farmhouses in these communities are elevated above the
ﬂoodplain. In contrast, the roads leading up to these farms
parallel the Markarﬂjót and some sections of these roads are
positioned at similar base heights to the river channel. Dykes
approximately 2m in height have been constructed to pro-
tect the roads but these ﬂood mitigation structures were not
builttowithstandacatastrophicjökulhlaup. Within3hHigh-
way 1 would be inundated and the entire outwash plain sur-
rounding the Markarﬂjót would be ﬂooded within 10h. With
a maximum ﬂood depth of up to 2m, low lying regions could
remain submerged for over 24h.
In view of the potential future hazard presented by jökulh-
laup, the Icelandic Civil Protection organisation (ICP) de-
veloped regional evacuation strategies based on a worst case
scenario as described in the report edited by Guðmundsson
and Gylfason (2005). This report and consequent strategies
were the culmination of a multidisciplinary investigation into
the physical threat of jökulhlaup produced from a Katla erup-
tion. It did not however, include research from a societal
aspect. Researchers argue that a collaboration between the
physical and social sciences is a key step toward achieving a
greater understanding of the consequences of volcanic haz-
ards (e.g. Johnston et al., 1999). Following the investigation
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communication sessions were held with residents from com-
munities located within the hazard zone in Rangávallasýsla:
Vestur-Eyjafjöll, Fljótshlíð, LandeyjarandÞykkvibær. These
consisted of information meetings in 2005 and 2006 regard-
ing the possibility of a future Katla eruption and the proposed
evacuation plan for a jökulhlaup hazard. During these meet-
ings residents were informed that they could collect an evac-
uation and hazard information sign from local police (Fig. 2)
(K. Þorkelsson, personal communication, 2006).
If an eruption is imminent residents would be notiﬁed via
a text message to their mobile phone. If residents do not have
a registered mobile phone number a recorded message would
call through to their landline. Upon receiving this message
residents have 30 minutes to prepare to evacuate. However, if
an eruption occurs without precursory activity, residents will
be instructed to evacuate immediately. Before leaving, they
are required to hang the evacuation sign outside their house
to indicate that they have left. Certain residents in each re-
gion have volunteered to ‘sweep’ their local area to ensure
their neighbours have left for the evacuation centres located
in Hella, Hvolsvöllur and Skógar. In order to reach these cen-
tres some residents must evacuate via the roads that parallel
the Markarﬂjót and along Highway 1.
To test the proposed evacuation plan the ICP conducted
a full scale evacuation exercise on 26 March 2006 in Rangá-
vallasýsla. Approximately1200residentslivewithinthehaz-
ard zone (K. Þorkelsson, personal communication, 2006) and
for the purpose of fully testing the evacuation plan residents
were not informed of the timing of the eruption scenario. In-
stead residents were instructed to go about their business as
usual until they received an evacuation message (R. Ólafs-
son, personal communication, 2006). The mock eruption be-
gan at 10:55local time (LT) and the ﬁrst evacuation message
was communicated to residents at 10:59LT. Residents then
had 30 minutes to complete the instructions on the hazard
sign (Fig. 2) before evacuating their homes to their desig-
nated centre.
Toimprovetheeffectivenessofresidents’compliancewith
warning and evacuation messages it is important that emer-
gency management ofﬁcials understand how the public in-
terpret their situation in relation to volcanic hazards and
their potential response during a crisis (Ronan et al., 2000;
Dominey-Howes and Minos-Minopoulos, 2004; Gregg et al.,
2004; Bird and Dominey-Howes, 2006, 2008; Haynes et al.,
2008; Paton et al., 2008). Therefore, this study (1) investi-
gates resident’s knowledge and perception of Katla, jökulh-
laup hazard and their views of the evacuation plan and ex-
ercise, and (2) reports the ﬁndings to help the ICP improve
mitigation strategies. To achieve this, ﬁeld observations were
made during the evacuation exercise, semi-structured inter-
views with key emergency management ofﬁcials were held
after the evacuation exercise, and questionnaire survey in-
terviews were conducted with local residents. The rationale
for using this sequential mixed methods approach is to better
understand the evacuation procedure from both a manage-
ment and public perspective and to develop and implement
a questionnaire survey interview to further explore partici-
pant views and knowledge. Before addressing the aim of our
research we will describe the methods used to conduct the
analysis.
2 Methods
A mixed methods approach, drawing from both qualitative
and quantitative data collection practices was used to ob-
tain public perception data. We were invited to observe the
evacuation exercise from within the emergency headquarters
(EH)inHellainadditiontomonitoringtheproceedingsatthe
evacuation centres (EC) in Hvolsvöllur and Hella. Following
the exercise, we conducted semi-structured interviews with
emergency management ofﬁcials and face-to-face question-
naire survey interviews with local residents living within the
hazard zone. Public perception research based solely on data
generated from questionnaire surveys is unable to capture the
complexity of a hazard in a societal context whereas a mixed-
methods approach, employing both qualitative and quantita-
tive techniques, provides the researcher with the opportunity
to acquire a variety of information on the same topic allow-
ing for a more accurate interpretation of the issues at hand
(Horlick-Jones et al., 2003; Haynes et al., 2007). In this sec-
tion, we describe the methods employed for ﬁeld observa-
tions and interviews followed by those adopted to construct
and deliver the questionnaire survey.
2.1 Observing the evacuation exercise
Located within the main EH, we (Bird and Gisladottir) ob-
served and documented the development and management
of the evacuation exercise. We were at the EH during the
most critical stages of the eruption scenario. As the erup-
tion developed we visited the EC in Hella and Hvolsvöllur to
observe the emergency management proceedings of the Red
Cross and to witness how the public behaved and responded
to the evacuation. Some informal discussions were held with
evacuees and Red Cross personnel at both centres. During
our observations we made written notes to ensure the most
signiﬁcant points were recorded.
2.2 Interviewing emergency management ofﬁcials
Follow-up interviews were conducted with the project man-
ager of ICP, the Chief of Police in Rangávallasýsla, the pres-
ident of the Icelandic Association for Search and Rescue
(ICE-SAR), a research scientist involved in the hazard as-
sessment report and coordination of the eruption scenario
for the evacuation exercise, a regional manager for the Red
Cross, and the Director of Communication for the Red Cross.
The format of the interview was semi-structured whereby
speciﬁc questions were asked about their departments’ role
in an emergency situation, their role during the exercise,
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Figure 2. Evacuation and hazard information sign distributed to residents located in the volcanic 
hazard zone surrounding Katla. English translations follow. 
A House evacuation (front)
When a warning is given you must evacuate within 30 minutes (15 minutes for Sólheima) to the 
nearest evacuation centre
 Get the first aid kit, follow this list and collect the valuables you want to take with you
 Unplug all electrical equipment as well as antennas
 Turn all household heaters off
 Remove fencing from the house and unplug all electric fences from the house electricity
31
Fig. 2. Evacuation and hazard information sign distributed to residents located in the volcanic hazard zone surrounding Katla. English
translations follow.
A House Evacuation (front)
When a warning is given by the ICP that an eruption in Katla is starting residents and their guests must evacuate within 30min (15min for
Sólheimar) to the nearest evacuation centre.
– Get the ﬁrst aid kit, follow this list and secure or collect the valuables you want to take with you.
– Unplug all electrical equipment as well as antennas.
– Set household heaters to a minimum temperature.
– Remove fencing from the house and unplug all electric fences from the house electricity.
– In the space provided indicate how many people have evacuated from this property and the number of vehicles used to evacuate. Fasten
this sign on the predetermined spot.
– Check on neighbours if possible and share vehicles to avoid unnecessary trafﬁc. Use vehicles that can drive faster than 50km/hr.
– Call 112 if there has been an accident or if you need help.
– It is not possible to move animals due to short evacuation time (30min, except for Sólheimar 15min).
– For animals that are housed, open the house and pen for all animals except bulls. Open gates and ensure that they can ﬂee to higher
ground.
– For animals that are outside, open gate and/or cut fences so that they can ﬂee to higher ground.
– Go straight to the nearest evacuation centre and register.
– Listen to announcements and news on radio.
Number of people evacuated from house: Number of vehicles used for evacuation:
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Fig. 2. Continued.
B Precautions due to subglacial eruptions (back left hand side)
During an eruption in Mýrdalsjökull those staying in the hazard area should think of the following:
1. Jökulhlaup, tephra fall and lightning within the plume usually follow a subglacial eruption. Jökulhlaup can go down Mýrdalssandur,
Sólheimasandur or the Markarﬂjót.
2. You should be very careful not enter areas of tephra fall as it can be completely dark even during the day. You should be observant of
weather changes and forecast of tephra fall.
3. Always stay on the side of the volcano in the direction of the wind. Avoid deep topographical depressions due to the accumulation of
poisonous gases.
4. If you happen to be in tephra fall use a moist cloth to cover your mouth and nose. Remember that the shortest distance from the ash
plume is transverse to the wind direction.
5. Do not stay on ﬂat land while the risk from jökulhlaup is predicted. Go to higher areas. If you are in an area that is ﬂooded by water
use a white ﬂag to signal for assistance.
Follow all announcements on TV and radio.
C Precautions due to lightning (back right hand side)
The risk for lightning is greatest in or close to the plume and can reach to a distance of 30–40km from the volcano itself.
1. When there is the risk of lightning you should seek shelter in secure buildings, out-houses or cars (not convertibles).
2. Unplug all equipment from electricity inside the house and from outdoor antennas including electrical equipment, radio transmitters.
Use indoor antennas if possible. Avoid using the telephone and remember that a phone may ring due to electricity from the lightning.
Disconnect all fences from the house and unplug electrical fences from the house electricity.
3. If you are outdoors you should avoid being close to high lines, high trees, poles, laundry lines, electrical poles, masts and agricultural
equipment of any kind. Try to avoid wetlands, water, and rivers.
4. Unload things that can attract electricity such as rucksacks and ﬁshing rods.
5. If you think that lightning will hit close to you and you cannot ﬁnd shelter, stay on your feet and crouch down with your hands on your
knees. Do not lay ﬂat.
Electricity does not remain in someone who has been hit by lightning. Call 112 and administer ﬁrst aid.
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their perception of the response behaviour of evacuees, and
whether or not they viewed the exercise to be a success. In
addition to reviewing their perception of the evacuation ex-
ercise, the contents of the resident questionnaire were dis-
cussed with each person. A tape recorder was used for in-
terviews when permission was granted. Written notes were
taken during all interviews and these were transcribed into
Microsoft Word® directly after each interview.
2.3 Conducting questionnaire survey interviews
Our questionnaire was constructed using a format developed
and tested by Bird and Dominey-Howes (2008) and adapted
to the geographic and hazard focus of Katla. Further ques-
tions were developed based on residents’ experience and dis-
cussion during the evacuation exercise. The ﬁnal structure of
the speciﬁc questions we included were discussed and nego-
tiated with regional emergency personnel to ensure that the
survey generated data of value to them in reviewing and im-
proving their emergency management strategies. Therefore,
it was important to pre-test our new questionnaire in order to
highlight any errors or inconsistencies and to assess whether
or not it would generate valuable data which are conducive to
the goals of the project (McGuirk and O’Neill, 2005; Parﬁtt,
2005; Bird and Dominey-Howes, 2008). The pilot phase was
carried out with local residents in April 2006. A few minor
problems arose with respect to wording and sequencing of
two questions. These issues were addressed prior to the main
study.
Each questionnaire was printed in English with Icelandic
translations. Translations were undertaken by a bilingual
translatorandthensenttoanotherbilingualtranslatorforver-
iﬁcation. Participants were given the choice of conducting
the interview in either English or Icelandic. To avoid misin-
terpretations and miscommunications translations were con-
ducted during the interview and only one translator was used
during the course of the study. Special and concise training
of translators is critical to ensure that questions are asked ex-
actly as intended and that participant responses are translated
fully and completely (Patton, 1990). Our translator received
thorough training prior to the study.
Face-to-face questionnaire survey interviews were con-
ducted with local residents in the hazard zone of Rangával-
lasýsla from May to October 2006. Since this was the ﬁrst
time an evacuation plan had been introduced to these com-
munities and this study was the ﬁrst of its kind to be held
in this region, face-to-face interviews were deemed to be the
most effective method for data collection. This is because it
allows the interviewer to probe for more detailed responses
when required as well as providing clariﬁcation if necessary
(McGuirk and O’Neill, 2005; Parﬁtt, 2005).
Participants were recruited using two non-probability
qualitative sampling methods. Firstly, a purposive sam-
pling technique was used to target residents living within
the hazard zone (i.e. residents registered in each commu-
nity within the hazard zone were directly contacted). Pur-
posive sampling is used to deliberately select subjects who
are thought to be relevant to the research topic (Sarantakos,
1998). Secondly, a snow-ball sampling technique was em-
ployed whereby the ﬁrst recruitment of participants sug-
gested other residents who might be available to participate
during the research period (Sarantakos, 1998). Despite ap-
parent biases with both these sampling techniques, each was
deemed appropriate to the study as we were actively seek-
ing knowledge and perception data from residents from each
community in the hazard zone. Furthermore, it is not our
intention to generalise our results from this sample to the
population as a whole, but rather provide a more descriptive
preliminary investigation of public perception in this region.
All residents were initially contacted by telephone and in-
terviews were arranged at a time convenient to them. Resi-
dents over 18years of age were targeted and all participants
were guaranteed anonymity. Prior to the interview each par-
ticipant was informed about the purpose of the questionnaire
and the proposed use of the data. They were also told that
they were free to withdraw from the survey at any given time
without consequence. Participants were required to sign Hu-
man Ethics forms to indicate that they agreed with the terms
of the survey interview.
The questionnaire was divided into three sections. The
ﬁrst section gathered classiﬁcation data about the participant.
The second section gathered information about their knowl-
edge and perception of Katla, jökulhlaup hazards and emer-
gency procedures. While the third section gathered informa-
tion about their attendance at, and their perception of, the
information meetings on Katla, the evacuation plan and ex-
ercise and their use of hazard information available through
various media sources. Each section contained both open
(free answer) and closed (check-list) questions. In total,
the questionnaire contained 52 questions and took approxi-
mately45mintocomplete. However, participantsweregiven
as much time as needed to complete the interview. All data
were analysed within SPSS® 15.0 (Statistical Package for
Social Science) and Microsoft Word®.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to present data gener-
ated from all 52questions. The questions we present here
were selected on the basis of the information they pro-
vide (i.e. we believe they have generated signiﬁcant data
which may be useful to emergency managers charged with
the responsibility of the ongoing development of risk mit-
igation procedures). An electronic copy of the question-
naire is available at http://www.nat-hazards-earth-syst-sci.
net/9/251/2009/nhess-9-251-2009-supplement..pdf or from
the corresponding author.
3 Results
Our results are divided into three sections. Firstly, we re-
port on our observations during the evacuation exercise on 26
March 2008. Secondly, information derived from the inter-
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views with emergency management ofﬁcials is documented.
Thirdly, we present results generated from the questionnaire
survey interviews with the residents. Comments recorded
verbatim are presented in bullet form. In total, 60 individuals
were interviewed; 6 emergency personnel and 54 residents.
3.1 The evacuation exercise of 26 March 2008
All people involved in the evacuation exercise were in-
structed to treat it as a real volcanic emergency situation.
Details on weather conditions were determined by ICP and
emergency personnel were expected to consider wind speed
and direction in relation to the development of the volcanic
plume. Regular updates of the height and width of the plume
were broadcast. Due to the possible hazard from tephra, heli-
copter pilots refused to ﬂy until EH gave them a direct order.
Following this, one helicopter was despatched with a leading
scientist to assess the eruption and another was on standby at
a nearby airstrip.
All ofﬁcials within EH held a round table meeting to dis-
cuss the progress of the eruption and evacuation every half
hour. The Chief of Police of Rangávallasýsla was in charge.
Everybody reported to him and he delegated responsibili-
ties as the day progressed. He enforced the need to stay in
constant contact with all personnel out in the ﬁeld. To test
the emergency teams for different situations actors were em-
ployed to role play residents who refused to evacuate, res-
idents who required medical assistance, people located in
a high risk area and in need of helicopter evacuation, and
tourists travelling within the hazard zone. The police were
instructed to arrest residents if they refused to evacuate (this
did not actually occur but residents who were refusing to
evacuate were told that they would be arrested in a real evac-
uation).
The main problem brought to the attention of the Red
Cross at the EC was the failure in communication – many
residents did not receive the evacuation message and during
the evacuation, the EH did not receive this message from the
EC. Despite this, approximately 65% of the population lo-
cated within the hazard zone of Rangávallasýsla registered
at the ECs. Talk amongst the residents at the EC included
the communication failure while many voiced their concerns
about leaving their animals. Another problem witnessed at
the EC was the time it took to manually register residents.
Several instances occurred where residents had not re-
ceived an evacuation warning but were asked to leave by
the sweepers and one family was rescued by the emergency
helicopter. Four elderly men arrived at the EC 3 hours af-
ter receiving the initial evacuation message. They were sur-
prised that no one had come to check on them. They were
not aware they were allocated 30 minutes for preparation
before evacuating. Red Cross personnel reported a misun-
derstanding about the time allocation for evacuation. Some
people were anxious to get to the EC within 30min while
others thought they had a lot longer. Furthermore, the EC
in Hvolsvöllur was not well signposted and some people (in-
cluding the present authors) could not easily ﬁnd it.
Regardless of the problems that arose during the evacu-
ation exercise, the general mood at each centre was good-
humoured. Residents joked about the fact that the communi-
cation system did not work as planned. Some participants
light-heartedly explained that they would have been inun-
dated by ﬂood water due to the fact that they had not received
any evacuation message (these residents went to the evacua-
tion centre on their own accord since they knew the exercise
was taking place). Resident behaviour and comments indi-
cated that many of them were there for the social aspect of
the day.
As a result of our observations during the exercise, speciﬁc
questions were developed for the questionnaire survey to in-
vestigate the failure in communicating the evacuation mes-
sage, the time allocated to residents to evacuate and whether
residents would refuse to evacuate during a real situation.
3.2 Interviews with emergency management ofﬁcials
All emergency management ofﬁcials gave a clear description
of their departments’ role and their own personal role dur-
ing an emergency situation. Each person that was in direct
contact with the evacuees reported an overall positive public
response. Comments in relation to this included:
• Approximately 65% of residents took part in the exer-
cise which suggests that people are probably taking this
seriously.
• Almost everyone was positive about the evacuation.
Some who didn’t receive the evacuation message were
mixed. Those who were not positive didn’t bother com-
ing.
• The evacuees were extremely positive about the exer-
cise. People were willing to participate probably due to
the major earthquakes that occurred in 2000.
The evacuation was viewed as a success by all emergency
management ofﬁcials. The main negative comments that
arose were attributable to the problem with the communi-
cation system. Comments in relation to this included:
• The information that is given to the people is crucial.
They need to know how long they have before the ﬂood
comes. Also timing of the warnings should allow time
for the rescue teams to help the evacuees if the weather
conditions are bad. The sweepers can play this role.
• Phone calls and sms (text messages) were not good.
People joked about this at the time but once they went
home they were probably more concerned that they
could have been stuck in a real ﬂood.
www.nat-hazards-earth-syst-sci.net/9/251/2009/ Nat. Hazards Earth Syst. Sci., 9, 251–266, 2009258 D. K. Bird et al.: Resident perception of volcanic hazards and evacuation procedures
• It is always the communication that breaks down and
therefore the sweeper’s role should be more concen-
trated on (providing warning and evacuation informa-
tion to people). Technology can break down especially
in a volcanic disaster. It must be organised as a door-to-
door operation.
• We have broadcast advertisements asking people to re-
port if they did not receive a message during the exer-
cise. We have asked them to give their details to the
local police and ICP directly so we can try to sort out
this problem.
3.3 Questionnaire survey interviews with residents
This section is divided as per the three sections of the ques-
tionnaire. The ﬁrst section describes participant demograph-
ics based on their responses to classiﬁcation questions. Par-
ticipants’ responses to both open and closed knowledge and
perception questions of Katla, jökulhlaup hazards and emer-
gency procedures are presented in the second section. The
third section reports participants’ responses to questions re-
lating to their attendance at and their perception of the infor-
mation meetings on Katla, the evacuation plan and exercise
and their use of hazard information available through various
media sources. The sequence of questions presented here is
the same sequence as that within the questionnaire. Quick-
look summary tables have been provided in each section for
speciﬁc closed questions.
3.3.1 Participant demographic
A total of 54 participants were recruited from 67 residents
who were approached to take part in the questionnaire sur-
vey interviews, providing a response rate of 81%. Our sam-
ple included 19% of participants from Vestur-Eyjafjöll, 26%
of participants from Fljótshlíð, 15% of participants from
Vestur-Landeyjar and 20% of participants from each Austur-
Landeyjar and Þykkvibær (Table 1). The majority (57%) of
participants were 51years of age or over and 57% of par-
ticipants lived within 2km of either the river Markarﬂjót
or Þverá. Nearly all participants (98%) had lived in Ice-
land most of their lives. Education qualiﬁcations of our par-
ticipants was quite diverse; 28% held a trade certiﬁcate or
diploma, 15% had a university degree or higher and a further
13% stated an education qualiﬁcation from another source.
Fifty percent of participants were full-time farmers while an-
other 9% were part-time farmers.
3.3.2 Residents’ knowledge and perception of Katla,
jökulhlaup hazard and emergency procedures
Participants were asked if they could give a brief eruptive
history of Katla and a deﬁnition of jökulhlaup. In order to
be counted as correct for the history of Katla, participants
were expected to mention: the last conﬁrmed eruption in
1918; or, the possible eruptions in 1955 and/or 1999; and,
the frequency of Katla eruptions as 1, 2 or 3 times per cen-
tury. However, some participants were counted as correct if
they mentioned just one of the above in addition to detailed
information about other aspects of Katla. Based on this, a
correct response was given by 63% of participants, 7% were
incorrect while a further 30% stated they did not know (Ta-
ble 2). None of the participants in the 18–30year age group
gave a correct answer while only 27% of the correct answers
came from the 31–50year age group. A correct response for
jökulhlaup was credited to answers that deﬁned a ﬂood of
water from a glacier. Nearly all participants (94%) gave a
correct response. Only 6% stated they did not know.
Sixty-seven percent of participants perceive that their re-
gion could be affected while 32% of participants stated no
they do not perceive the hazard could affect their region.
Eighty percent of participants from the community of Vestur-
Eyjafjöll do not perceive the threat to their area and 93% of
these people live within 2km of the Markarﬂjót.
When the participants were asked if they are aware of the
emergency procedures they need to follow if a jökulhlaup
warning is issued 89% responded “yes”. Seventy-one per-
cent of participants correctly described the evacuation proce-
dure, 19% stated that they would stay in their homes while
the remaining 10% said that it would depend on:
• If it was occurring right away we would stay. If we had
a few hours we might go to Hvolsvöllur;
• I would go to higher ground if at night or during bad
weather. If the weather is good and it is daylight I would
follow the evacuation procedure and go to Hvolsvöllur;
and,
• I would follow the plan to some extent but I would use
commonsense especially if they tell me to do something
that I know is wrong or dangerous.
Of the participants that live in Vestur-Eyjafjöll 60% of them
said they would stay in their homes. Reasons given to clarify
their response were:
• We consider ourselves safe where we live and therefore
we will not evacuate. Also, for health reasons I feel
better about staying at home;
• All farms in this community are 30–40m higher than
the river bed;
• I would not evacuate as I feel safe and comfortable in
my own home. I am concerned about driving along the
road which in my opinion is very dangerous as the road
is in the lowland area and close to the river. After 30
minutes we will spend much time in the danger zone
driving out of this area; and,
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Table 1. Participant responses from Sect. 1: Classiﬁcation questions. All data are given as a percentage. Some sections do not equal 100%
due to rounding.
In what region Vestur-Eyjafjöll Fljótshlíð Vestur-Landeyjar Austur-Landeyjar Þykkvibær
of Rangávallasýsla 19 26 15 20 20
do you live?
What is your age group? 18–30years old 31–50years old 51+ years old
7 35 57
How far from the river 0<2km 2<5km 5<10km 10+ km
do you live? 57 33 7 2
In which country have Iceland Other
you lived the longest? 98 2
What is the highest level Some Educated Educated Trade University Other
of education you schooling 6–16years 6–20years certiﬁcate/ degree
have completed? Diploma or higher
9 20 15 28 15 13
What is your occupation? Full-time farmer Part-time farmer Other
50 9 41
Table 2. Participant responses from Sect. 2: Questions on Katla, jökulhlaup hazards and the warning system. All data are given as a
percentage. The second question does not equal 100% due to rounding. The last question totals more than 100% as participants were
allowed to rank several hazards as the most serious.
Correct Incorrect Don’t know
Can you tell me a brief eruptive history of Katla? 63 7 30
How would you deﬁne jökulhlaup? 94 0 6
Do you think the region where you live could be affected by a jökulhlaup? Yes No Don’t know
67 32 2
Are you aware of the emergency procedures you need to follow if a jökulhlaup Yes No
warning is issued? 89 11
What would you deﬁne as the most serious hazard in your area if Katla were to erupt? Jökulhlaup 62
Ice blocks 11
Lightning 9
Tephra 26
Poisonous gases 2
Lava 0
Tsunami 0
Earthquake 4
• We would not evacuate. We would stay here on the
farm. It is safer here than on the road. Tephra may
block the road and rock fall may occur due to seismic
activity.
If a Katla eruption commenced prior to the ICP issuing a
warning 55% of participants stated that they would call 112
or the police (the most popular response) for information
while a further 28% would seek information from the radio,
television or internet. Sixty-two percent of participants con-
sidered jökulhlaup as the most serious hazard in their area if
Katla were to erupt while tephra was deemed most serious
by 26% (Table 2). We then allocated scores to the rankings
(i.e. the most serious hazard was allocated a score of 8; the
second most serious was allocated a score of 7 and so on). A
nil score was allocated if no ranking was given. Each hazard
was ranked at least once (Fig. 3) with jökulhlaup and tephra
scoring the highest respectively.
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Fig. 3.Participants’ perception of the most serious hazards produced
during a Katla eruption.
3.3.3 Residents’ knowledge and perception of the informa-
tion meetings on Katla, evacuation plan and exercise,
and hazard information in the media
More than half the participants did not attend information
meetings on Katla and the proposed evacuation plan and ex-
ercise. Reasons stated for not attending included:
• Could not attend due to health reasons;
• At work;
• Too busy when they were on; and,
• Not interested.
Other people stated they did not attend but others within
their household did. For those that did attend, we enquired
whether they found them informative. Only 5% of partici-
pants did not ﬁnd them informative. Participant perceptions
of the meetings included:
• The simulation and displays were very informative but
the sound system was very bad and therefore I could not
hear the talks so well.
• It is good to talk about this and make people aware.
• I found the meetings very informative and now there is
direct information on what to do if something happens.
They educated people and now the local people should
not be as afraid as they know what to do.
• I found the meeting informative but they needed more
preparation. The people in charge lacked knowledge
and those presenting the meetings were not the most ex-
perienced. There was no geologist at the last meeting.
• Most of it was nonsense. In the Westman Islands in
1973 everyone had to save themselves and it worked.
Here will be the same.
Sixty nine percent of participants did not receive any evac-
uation message during the exercise (Table 3) and of these,
49% did not receive a message to their landline. When asked
if they always carried their mobile phone 68% of participants
responded “yes”. However, only 52% of farmers carry their
mobile phone with them at all times. Of those participants
that always carry their mobile phone, 34% said they do not
always have an active connection in their area.
Participation during the evacuation exercise was rather
highwith68%ofparticipantsstatingtheydidtakepart. Their
reasons for participation included:
• It is part of my duties as an Icelandic citizen;
• I took part in the evacuation for my own safety and my
family’s;
• I thought it would be good for people to know how to
act;
• I wanted to participate to check how long it would take
us to prepare but we didn’t complete the whole list on
the evacuation sign; and,
• I did take part but I didn’t really gain anything from it.
Those who did not take part clariﬁed their actions by stating:
• Too tired and sick;
• I was at work but everyone else in the house took part;
• We would have participated if we had received the evac-
uation message; and,
• Not interested as I do not perceive that I will be in dan-
ger.
Despite some people’s negativity toward the evacuation exer-
cise of those who did participate 82% of them were positive
about the exercise.
Thirty minutes was deemed enough time to complete the
list as described on the evacuation sign (Fig. 2) before evacu-
ating their property by 52% of participants. Of the 48% that
stated no or don’t know they responded with:
• It is not enough time if you have to let the animals out
(as per the instructions);
• 30min is not enough time for farmers;
• 30min may not be enough depending where I am on the
farm; and,
• It depends if the kids are at home from school and if I
am at work in Hvolsvöllur then I would have to drive
back to the house to collect them.
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Table 3. Participant responses from Sect. 3: Questions on Katla information meetings, evacuation plan, evacuation exercise and hazard
information available in the media. All data are given as a percentage.
None One Two Three
How many Katla information meetings did you attend? 55 29 4 12
How many evacuation messages did you receive on the 26 March 2006? 69 19 6 6
If you did not receive any messages did you receive a phone call to the Yes No
landline or your mobile phone? 51 49
Do you always carry your mobile phone with you? 68 32
Do you always have service coverage to Yes No Don’t know
your mobile phone around your area? 64 34 2
Did you take part in the evacuation exercise? Yes No
68 32
If you did take part in the exercise Positive Negative Mixed
on 26 March 2006 how did you feel about it? 82 8 10
Do you think 30min is enough time to complete Yes No Don’t know
the list (on the evacuation sign) and evacuate? 52 42 6
Would you follow this procedure if there was a real evacuation? 74 18 8
Have you looked up the ICP website and familiarised Yes No
yourself with information on the possible natural
hazards connected to a Katla eruption? 19 81
Have you ever used the Skjálftavefsjá/IMO
website for hazard information? 26 74
Have you followed discussions in the media about
natural hazards connected to a Katla eruption? 89 11
With these comments in mind it is not surprising that 64%
of farmers do not believe that 30min is enough time. Fur-
thermore, several participants were under the impression that
they had 30min to complete the list and get to the evacuation
centre. These people expressed great concern about this be-
cause for some of them it takes 30min to drive to the closest
evacuation centre. These residents were located in Austur
and Vestur-Landeyjar (Fig. 1).
Only 19% of participants had accessed hazard informa-
tion related to a Katla eruption from the ICP website (www.
almannavarnir.is) while 26% of participants had accessed
hazard information from the Skjálftavefsjá (earthquake web-
viewer) website (drifandi.vedur.is/) and the Icelandic Meteo-
rological Ofﬁce (IMO) website (www.vedur.is). Media dis-
cussions about natural hazards connected to a Katla eruption
were followed by 89% of participants and they sourced this
information from television (88%), radio (82%), newspaper
(72%), information brochures (54%), books (40%) and the
internet (20%).
Once the questionnaire had been completed the partici-
pants were given the opportunity to engage in open discus-
sion. Many participants stated their reluctance to leave their
animals and some believe that due to this many farmers may
choose to stay at home during an actual evacuation. Some
participants would like to see the hazard zone reclassiﬁed in
order to rank the areas according to the level of risk. These
participants felt that people may be complacent as they do
not recognise they are actually living in a high risk area and
therefore they may prefer to stay at home with their ani-
mals during a Katla eruption. Furthermore, many people ex-
pressed concern about completing all the instructions on the
evacuation list and of particular concern was the instruction
to release animals from their enclosures.
Another important message communicated during the dis-
cussionswasthegreatconcernfortephrafallout. Participants
not only feared personal health risks – one participant stated
“we have bought ourselves gas masks in case of tephra” – but
also related risks associated with the complete darkness that
can be experienced during the middle of the day, the threat
to agricultural land and the threat to car engines. However,
one of the most important statements that arose during these
discussions was regarding residents’ involvement in the de-
velopment of the evacuation plan. Several residents objected
that they had no say in how the evacuation should be imple-
mented within their communities and following the exercise
they were not informed about how successful the drill had
been.
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4 Discussion
A unique opportunity was presented during and after the
evacuation exercise to assess resident knowledge, behaviour
and perception of Katla, jökulhlaup hazard and the evacua-
tion plan – a task which had never been done for volcanic
hazards in Iceland. A short time window was offered to
capture residents’ views of the exercise before they forgot
this practical experience of risk mitigation. Our small sam-
ple size reﬂects this brief window of opportunity but the
data collected provide an in-depth account stemming from
a mixed methods approach which incorporated ﬁeld obser-
vations, semi-structured interviews with emergency manage-
ment ofﬁcials and questionnaire survey interviews with resi-
dents.
The problem of poor communication became evident
through our ﬁeld observations at the EC and was later reiter-
ated during interviews with emergency management ofﬁcials
and residents. The issue of communication between scien-
tists, emergency management ofﬁcials and the public can in-
hibit a successful response to evacuation orders (Chester et
al., 2002). During the exercise, communication of the evac-
uation warning was not adequate and some residents were
unaware the drill had commenced. This was conﬁrmed in a
post-exercise assessment report, where it was stated that the
evacuation warning was not communicated effectively to res-
idents (Almannavarnir, 2006). Effective communication not
only refers to broadcasting hazard information but also the
public and media’s ability to understand the nature, mean-
ing and intent of the warning (Dominey-Howes et al., 2007).
Communication strategies should be developed with respect
to the intended audience and in consideration of social psy-
chological factors which may inﬂuence whether or not peo-
ple assimilate this information and respond accordingly (Pa-
ton and Johnston, 2001).
The particular role of communication was noted by the
president of the International Union of Geodesy and Geo-
physics (IUGG) during the 2008 International Association
of Volcanology and Chemistry of the Earth’s Interior (IAV-
CEI) conference held in Iceland. He emphasised the need for
successful communication in volcanic crises and questioned
the reliance on modern technology to relay hazard informa-
tion. This strong dependence on modern technology created
problems during the evacuation exercise. To exacerbate this
situation, approximately half the farmers in this region stated
they do not carry a mobile phone with them at all times and
it is these residents who are most likely to be away from a
landline. It is therefore critical they receive an evacuation
message through an alternative mode. The sweepers in some
regionswereabletonotifythoseresidentswhowereunaware
that the evacuation had commenced. However, through our
interviews we were able to ascertain that certain residents
were not contacted by phone or sweeper.
Residents were concerned about their own personal safety
due to the time it would take them to release livestock from
the enclosures. Other residents were concerned about the
safety of their animals after being released. They believe
it would be safer to leave them inside especially with re-
spect to tephra fall out. Time was a recurring issue as people
were confused about the time allocated for them to evacuate
particularly with residents located 30min from the EC.
Empowerment is described by Paton et al. (2008) as an
individual’s capacity to have control over their personal af-
fairs and confront hazard issues while receiving the neces-
sary support from emergency management ofﬁcials. Some
residents described a loss of empowerment as they were not
involved in the development of the evacuation plan and they
were told they had to follow the plan (or be arrested) contrary
to their own knowledge and perception. Furthermore, during
the interview period residents had not received any feedback
regarding the success of the exercise. Despite these short-
comings all the emergency management ofﬁcials interviewed
in this study deemed the evacuation exercise a success. This
notion was enforced by the majority of our participants who
took part in the exercise.
The questionnaire survey interviews revealed that even
though most participants were able to demonstrate an ac-
curate understanding of the eruptive history of Katla and
nearly all participants correctly deﬁned jökulhlaup, many
(32%) think their area of residence would not be affected by
a jökulhlaup. Alarmingly, 80% of participants from Vestur-
Eyjafjöllsharethisvieweventhough93%ofthemlivewithin
2km of the river. However, these participants clariﬁed their
beliefs by stating their homes, like others in this commu-
nity, are located approximately 30–40m above the river bed.
Considering that the hazard assessment and consequent haz-
ard map modelled a catastrophic jökulhlaup reaching a max-
imum ﬂood depth of at least 15m upstream of these houses
it is understandable that many participants feel it is safer to
stay in their homes during a Katla eruption.
Notably, none of the participants from the 18–30year age
group and very few from the 31–50year age group could cor-
rectly describe a brief volcanic history of Katla. An impor-
tantelementforcommunityresilienceisinheritedmemoryof
volcanic activity (Dominey-Howes and Minos-Minopoulos,
2004). Those residents whose parents experienced the 1918
Katla eruption displayed inherited memory of the eruption.
However, this knowledge has not been passed down to the
next generation.
Reassuringly, nearly all participants are aware of the emer-
gency procedures they need to follow if an evacuation warn-
ing is issued even though some participants stated they would
not evacuate. Again, Vestur-Eyjafjöll participant responses
stood out from the group with 60% of them replying they
would stay in their homes. In addition to their homes be-
ing located higher than the river, the evacuation route for
this community travels alongside the Markarﬂjót. To further
exacerbate their concerns residents feel that the evacuation
route may place them in a vulnerable position to other haz-
ards such as rock fall and tephra. However, non-hazard re-
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lated factors may also inﬂuence residents’ decision making
process during a Katla eruption. It is possible that socio-
economic constraints such as personal and economic con-
nection to livestock may inﬂuence residents’ decision on
whether or not to evacuate.
Regardless of the communication failures during the evac-
uation exercise most participants said they would call the
emergency number 112 or the police to obtain information
about a Katla eruption. However, telephone communication
is likely to fail or yield busy signals for speciﬁc phone num-
bers if the network is oversaturated with calls. Exceeding the
capacity of regional telecommunication systems complicates
the task for emergency management ofﬁcials and scientiﬁc
agencies to gather and distribute hazard information by tele-
phone (Gregg et al., 2004). It is therefore optimal for emer-
gency management ofﬁcials to promote public use of the me-
dia during a volcanic crisis. The media can provide an impor-
tant source of volcanic hazard information for the public and
attention should focus on increasing the planned use of this
resource and ensuring that it provides consistently accurate
information (Johnston et al., 1999). Risk mitigation strate-
gies should include developing a mutually productive rela-
tionship between media organisations and emergency man-
agement ofﬁcials in the form of a crisis communication plan
to manage the media during a disaster (Hughes and White,
2006).
Participants demonstrated good knowledge of possible
hazards that can occur during a future Katla eruption with
jökulhlaup, tephra and lightning cited as the most serious.
Possessing knowledge of possible hazards ensures that the
individual is better equipped to decide whether they should
engage in personal preparedness measures and the most ap-
propriate way to achieve this goal (Paton et al., 2008). Our
participants’ knowledge and concern of tephra was high-
lighted by one individual who stated that they had taken
their own preparedness measures for tephra by purchasing
gas masks.
Participant feedback on information provided at the town
meetings held to discuss the possibility of a Katla eruption
and the proposed evacuation plan was positive. Nearly all
participants stated that the scientiﬁc information presented
through talks, simulations and displays was very informa-
tive. A fundamental element of the pathway of information
from scientists, emergency management ofﬁcials and the me-
dia is ensuring that it is delivered to the public in a form
that represents community needs and functions (Ronan et
al., 2000; Gregg et al., 2004). Critical feedback relating to
the lack of knowledge and experience of those presenting
material at the meetings and technical difﬁculties should be
addressed. Considering that the public are more than just
passive receivers of hazard information (Horlick-Jones et al.,
2003; Murdock et al., 2003), an integrated approach, that
facilitates active participation from both residents and emer-
gency management ofﬁcials within a risk mitigation frame-
work will help increase public trust, risk acceptance and will-
ingness to adopt personal preparedness measures (Paton et
al., 2008).
Participation during the evacuation exercise was reason-
ably good with approximately 65% of residents taking part.
Our sample group of residents reﬂected this rate with 68%
stating that they took part. Apart from participating in or-
der to improve personal safety and preparedness, many par-
ticipants stated they took part in the exercise as they be-
lieved it was “their duty” to do so. Similarly, Haynes et
al. (2008) reported that during an ongoing volcanic crisis on
the Caribbean Island of Montserrat participants followed or-
ders because it was the right thing to do.
Although an overwhelming majority of participants have
followed media discussions concerning Katla most have not
actively sourced hazard information available on the internet.
Internet usage was quite low even though Bird et al. (2008)
reported that 83% of Icelandic households have internet con-
nection and 79% of internet users interact with public author-
ities. Despite this, it is important to utilise all forms of media
as individuals prefer various means of acquiring information
(Haynes et al., 2008). Furthermore, the perceived credibil-
ity and trust in hazard information can be compromised if
forms of distribution are limited (e.g. just pamphlets and TV
advertising) (Paton et al., 2008).
The precise location of a future eruption is uncertain there-
fore making it impossible to predict which direction the
jökulhlaup will ﬂow from the glacier margin (Sturkell et al.,
2008). Furthermore, adequate preparation for all hazard con-
sequences, such as lightning and tephra, is essential for all
residents. The infrequent and complex nature of volcanic
hazards increases the public’s need to have easily accessible
expert information in order to guide their risk management
decisions (Paton et al., 2008).
In summary, the key outcomes of this research are:
• Improve the communication system.
• Emphasise the sweepers’ role in supporting the dissem-
ination of warning and evacuation information.
• Provide more detailed information on the effects of
other volcanic hazards such as tephra, lightning and
rock fall and what preparedness measures can be ap-
plied to best protect person, property and livestock.
• Ensure that all residents know exactly how much time
they have to evacuate.
• Empower residents through involvement in risk mitiga-
tion planning.
• Provide feedback on proposed strategy outcomes within
a reasonable timeframe (for example, within 3months
after completion).
• Continue to provide hazard information within an ap-
propriate timeframe at town meetings with knowledge-
able experts. The timeframe should be based on the
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level of alert (i.e. meetings should be more frequent
when there is a higher risk of an eruption).
• Promotetheuseofallmediasourcesforvolcanichazard
information.
4.1 Further developments and future research
Sturkelletal.(2008)reportonseismicandgeodeticmeasure-
ments from around Katla between 1999 and 2005. Although
increasing rates of crustal deformation and seismicity have
lowered considerably, they believe that the volcano remains
in an agitated state and an eruption in the near future should
be expected. Therefore continued development of risk miti-
gation procedures is essential.
Improvements have been made to the communication sys-
tem following the failures during the evacuation exercise and
plans are underway to test the network (K. Þorkelsson, per-
sonal communication, 2008). The ICP has conﬁrmed the
problem is being rectiﬁed and that the chief of police in
Rangávallasýsla is charged with the responsibility of test-
ing the communication system during a follow-up exercise
(R. Ólafsson, personal communication, 2008). Town meet-
ings were organised with local residents in Rangávallasýsla
during 2008. Residents were given the opportunity to voice
their concerns with the evacuation plan (K. Þorkelsson, per-
sonal communication, 2008). In order to better suit com-
munity needs and expectations, information gathered during
these meetings is being used to develop more appropriate
evacuation procedures.
Our preliminary investigation entails a descriptive view of
public knowledge and perception from a select group of res-
idents living in each community in the Rangávallasýsla haz-
ard zone. As a result it is impossible to infer that results
generated through our research apply to the population as a
whole. In order to establish a clear idea of how the general
public will respond during a future volcanic event and the
complex range of natural and social phenomena that affect
the decision making process, more detailed research needs
to be conducted with a much larger sample group. Consid-
ering that the residents of Rangávallasýsla are not the only
ones located in the hazard zone this investigation has been
expanded to include residents located in the hazards zones to
the south and east of Mýrdalsjökull. A parallel study is also
being conducted with tourists and tourism employees within
Þórsmörk, a popular tour destination located west of Mýrdal-
sjökull. Following the recent meetings with residents and
current progress toward developing more appropriate evac-
uation procedures further studies should investigate whether
or not they suit community needs and expectations.
5 Conclusions
The evacuation plan is the ﬁrst to be developed and im-
plemented in the municipality of Rangávallasýsla and the
ICP, scientists, local police and rescue teams should be com-
mended for their efforts. However, more work needs to be
done to reduce the impact of a future Katla eruption. This
can be achieved by addressing some of the main issues raised
by our participants. The data provides an insight into how
residents interpret their situation in relation to Katla, its as-
sociated hazards and their potential response during a cri-
sis. This information highlights the importance of integrat-
ing the physical characteristics of Katla’s volcanic hazards
within context of the communities at risk. Our participants
are aware of jökulhlaup, tephra, lightning and rock fall haz-
ards but they have not been provided with enough informa-
tion to enable them to make an informed decision on whether
to evacuate or take shelter in place and how to best protect
their livestock. Comparatively, from the information pro-
vided, residents in Vestur-Eyjafjöll have been able to con-
clude that their homes will not be directly affected by jökulh-
laup and therefore they are not willing to evacuate. However,
non-hazard related factors such as not wanting to leave an-
imals unattended may also inﬂuence their decision to evac-
uate. Furthermore, residents’ participation in the evacuation
exercise does not necessarily reﬂect their willingness to evac-
uate. These examples underline the complex range of natural
and social phenomena that affect the individual’s decision
making process and as a result may inhibit a successful evac-
uation.
Results from our study highlighted problems associated
with communication during the evacuation exercise and the
possible need to ﬁnd alternative modes which do not rely so
heavily on technology. In light of this, scientists and emer-
gency management ofﬁcials should collaborate with media
agencies and the public in order to promote the use of me-
dia resources and, to ensure hazard information is accurately
distributed in an understandable form. Furthermore, the im-
portance of the sweepers’ role during an evacuation should
be emphasised as they may provide the only communication
link between emergency management and farming commu-
nities. Recent public meetings which involved residents in
risk mitigation efforts are a positive step toward empower-
ing residents with evacuation procedures and preparedness
strategies.
This paper presents the ﬁrst results on residents’ knowl-
edge and perception of Katla, jökulhlaup hazard and their
views of the evacuation plan and exercise in Rangávallasýsla.
The key outcomes, as summarised above, should help pro-
vide considerable value to the ongoing development of an
effective response capability. Considering this research is the
ﬁrst of its kind in this region the results can be used as a base-
line by the ICP for more robust surveys in Iceland’s volcanic
regions.
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